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THE CONNALLY AMENDMENTTHE CONFLICT BETWEEN NATIONALISM AND AN
EFFECTIVE WORLD COURT
INMODUCION

In 1945, the International Court of Justice was established as the
principal judicial organ of the United Nations.' All nations which
are members of the United Nations are members of the court, 2 but no
nation can be sued there in the absence of a voluntary acceptance of
its jurisdiction.3 Voluntary acceptance to all future disputes can be
accomplished through the mechanics of compulsory jurisdiction whereby the member state declares to recognize jurisdiction of the court as
compulsory in all legal disputes concerning: 1) the interpretation of a
treaty; 2) any question of international law; 3) the existence of any
fact which, if established, could constitute a breach of an international
obligation; and 4) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made
for the breach of an international obligation. 4 An acceptance can
employ conditions limiting its application. 5
Probably not one person out of ten in the United States knows
what the Connally amendment is or what its consequences in the
future could be. Therefore, the proper setting must be cast. The
Senate Foreign Relations Committee's recommendation of compulsory
adherence to the jurisdiction of the International Court contained a
specific reservation of "disputes with regard to matters which are
6
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States."
On the Senate floor, Senator Tom Connally of Texas, chairman of the
committee, proposed an amendment to the resolution as advanced by
Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon, by adding the words "as determined
by the United States of America." 7 Previously, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, in a unanimous report, expressly rejected the
idea advanced at hearings, that the domestic jurisdiction reservation
should also reserve for the United States the power to determine
which disputes are domestic and which are not. The report said that
the Committee had decided "that a reservation of the right to decision
I U.N.
ed. 1948).

Dma T OF PUBLIC INFolurAToN, EvEnxmtAN's UNrTED NATIONS

2 STAT. IT'L CT. JUST.

arts. 84 and 85.

3 STAT. INTL

art. 86, para. 1.

CT. JUST.

4 STAT. IrL
CT. JusT. art. 86, para. 2.
5 STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 86, para. 8.
6 94 coNG. nEc. 10621 (1946).

(Ist

7 Baldwin, An Alternative to the Connally Amendment as a Practical and
Realistic Step Toward World Peace Through Law, 18 S.C.L.Q. 516 (1961).
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as to what are matters essentially within domestic jurisdiction would
tend to defeat the purposes which it is hoped to achieve... There are basically two views as to the actual effect of the Connally amendment. 9 The first would explain that from the background
of the policy always followed by the United States, the amendment
is flatly meant to give the United States sole power to determine if the
International Court has jurisdiction over a claim against the United
States by another nation. The second view proposes that in light of
the acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction by the United States, the
amendment means merely that the court must give weight to the
United States' determination but it retains the power to examine
whether the determination is reasonably tenable and reject it if it is
arbitrary or capricious. 10 Many say that the main purpose of the
amendment is to create a two-way veto power over the International
Court's jurisdiction. The other veto power over the court is article 36,
paragraph 2, of the court's statute, which gives the court jurisdiction
limited to four categories."
Tim Azvmmim.Nr's HisroAY
2
The Connally amendment became precedent when put into effect.'
Then Mexico, Liberia, Pakistan, Sudan, South Africa, France, Great
Britain and India adopted similar reservations. The latter three nations
have since repealed them. 13 The Connally amendment was invoked in
one case by the United States. In the Interhandel Case,14 brought by
Switzerland, the United States invoked the amendment as one of the
four preliminary objections to the court's jurisdiction. Although both
litigants urged the court to rule on the validity of the amendment, it
decided that the matter was clearly not within its jurisdiction on other
grounds and, therefore, refused to rule on the amendment. It is
important to note that the United States did not rely on the Connally
reservation alone to combat the court's jurisdiction. In the only other
8 Tondel, The Connally Reservation Should Be Repealed, 46 A.B.A.J. 726

(1960).

9 Named after its originator, Senator Tom Connally of Texas.
10 Seblesinger, The Connally Amendment-Amelioration by Interpretation? 48
Va. L. Rev. 685(1962).
74. 11 Larson, The Facts, the Law, and the Connally Amendment, 1961 Duke L.J.
12 Sobn, International Tribunals: Past, Present and Future, 46 A.B.A.J. 23
(1960).
l 3 Ober, The Connally Reservation and National Security, 47 A.B.A.J. 63
(1961).
14 [1959] I.C.J. Rep. 6.
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case involving a Connally-type reservation, France, who had the
reservation, sued Norway for payment of a bonded debt in gold. As a
matter of reciprocity, Norway invoked the reservation.' 5 But, Norway
did not rely solely on her right to declare the matter domestic. She
advanced other reasons why the matter was domestic as a matter of
law.' 6
The United States has appeared before the court as a party
plaintiff in at least five cases since the Connally amendment. They
all involved incidents with Russia or one of her satellite states and the
defendant did not attempt to use the reciprocity rule to invoke our
reservation against us to deny the court jurisdiction. But, in each case,
the court lacked jurisdiction because the defendant had not accepted
compulsory jurisdiction, and did not submit specially for that particular case. 17
Any analysis of a procedural outlet should include a background
picture of the particular court in order to determine the intent within
the minds of the founders. Founders of the International Court had
high expectations. One committee had this to say:
On the basis of the text proposed for the Charter and for the

Statute, the First Committee ventures to forsee a significant role for the
new Court in the international relations of the future. The judicial
process will have a central place in the plans of the United Nations for
the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. An adequate

tribunal will exist for the exercise of the judicial function, and it vll
rank as a principal organ of the Organization. It is confidently anticipated that the jurisdiction of this tribunal will be extended as time goes
on, and past experience warrants the expectation that the exercise of this
jurisdiction will command a general support.' 8

There is also a general negative and pessimistic viewpoint on the
possibilities of a world government through a world court with
adequate jurisdiction. A prominent writer said:
There is little reason to expect that the nations of the world court

could establish a world court with compulsory jurisdiction. How could

it keep the peace? The long-standing and operative causes of war do not
constitute justiciable controversies. Nations go to war over problems
that no court can settle. [He names expanding populations, commercial

rivalries, unequal distribution of natural resources, conflicting ideologies,
religious differences, traditional enmities, and lust for power].
15 Reciprocity is defined by Black as a term .. used in international law to
denote the relation existing between two states when each of them gives the
subjects of the other certain privileges, on condition that its own subjects shall
enjoy similar privileges at the hands of the latter state. He also used one word
which describes the term, "mutuality." Black, LAw Dsar1oNAny (4th ed. 1951).
16 [1957] I.C.J. Rep. 9.

17
18 Crabb, On Judging the Connally Amendment, 50 Ceo. L.J. 529 (1961-62).
Doc. No. 913, IV/114, 13 U.N. CoNF. INT'L OR(. Docs. 381, at 393
(1945).
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We must abide with independent sovereign nations. World government is only a dream, a fruitless venture into idealism. Think of giving
power to a world government to make a declaration of war 'to keep the
peace' binding upon us and which might well be against our wishes and
national interests. How fantastic it is to think that the rising tide of
human passions that break the peace can ever be resolved by a court
of law. Law is neither a self-generating mechanism nor is it selfarises from consideraenforcing. We are ruled by positive law which
tions of public policy and social convenience. 19

It is next important to note the varying degrees of limitation
imposed on acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction by other nations,
which can be classified into seven categories:
GRoUP ONE. These nations can simply terminate the court's jurisdiction at any time without cause. The restraint is in 20the acceptance
and is the most severe type of limitation of acceptance.
GROUP Two. Here, jurisdiction is accepted and the nation in point
cannot revoke acceptance until the expiration of a specified length of
time.-'
GROUP TDREE. Two nations employ similar reservations to the
22
Connally amendment and no other limitation.
Jurisdiction is accepted as compulsory subject to
23
within a certain length of time.
notice
by
termination
GROUP FoUm.

GRoUrP FroE. Within this group, jurisdiction is accepted for successive five year terms which terminate only on notice given not less
24
than si: months prior to the end of the five year term.

GRoUP Si. There are several nations which cannot accurately be

placed in a specific category because of peculiarities in drafting ob25
jectives. 1
GROUP SE-VEN. Seven nations have accepted compulsory jurisdic26
tion but can terminate their acceptances at any time.
19
Briggs, The Cloudy Prospects for "Peace Through Law," 46 A.B.A.J. 490
(1960).
"')
Australia, Canada, Honduras, India, New Zealand, Pakistan, Phillipines,
Portugal, Sudan Union of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland. Zeiss, The Connally Reservation and the InternationalCourt of
Justice, 42 Chi.B.Rec. 409 (1960-61).
21 Belgium, Cambodia, France, Japan. Ziess, supra note 20.
22
Liberia and Mexico. Ziess, supra note 20.
2
3 China, Liechtenstein (not a member of the UN), Mexico, Switzerland,
United
2 States. Ziess, supra note 20.
1Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden. Ziess,
supra note 20.
25 El Salvador, France, India, Thailand, United Arab Republic. Ziess, supra
note 26
20.
Colombia, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Uruguay, Nicaragua, Paraguay,
Panama. Ziess, supra note 20.
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Other nations, including all of the Iron Curtain countries, have
not accepted compulsory jurisdiction in any form. These nations
numbered sixty-three as of September, 1960.27 It can readily be seen
that there is not only a lack of consistency as to the reservations on
acceptance, but there are also many nations who refuse to accept it in
any degree, however slight.
DiscussioN

There is admittedly great controversy on the value of the Connally
amendment to the United States. Arguments for both sides range
from thoughtful and intelligent to naive and impulsive. This writer
favors the repeal of the amendment for reasons discussed later,
primarily because he cannot perceive any other long-range solution
to our world turmoil and because the present amendment is an
obvious defense mechanism which deceives no one but the most
shallow of thinkers. It makes a mockery of one of the institutions on
which any organized society is founded-that of rules to guide and
direct all the people and more important, law and order for the whole
society.
Both sides of the argument will be presented as objectively as
possible to leave the reader with an opportunity to think for himself
and form his own opinions as to the true value of the amendment to
our country and to the world organization which we actively support.
A. For Repeal
The basic issue is whether the United States should accept the
jurisdiction of the International Court over questions of international
law free of the Connally amendment. There are two other so-called
"guarantees" that the court will not assume jurisdiction over domestic
matter. Article 2, Paragraph 7, of the United Nations Charter states:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any State or shall require the members to submit such
matters to settlement under the present Charter....
2
TAfghanistan, Albania, Argentina, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma,
Byleorussian S.S.R., Ceylon, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovaia, Ecuador,
Ethiopia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran,
Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Laos, Lebanon, Libya, Malaya, Morocco,
Nepal, Peru, Poland, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Tunisia, Ulxanian S.S.R.,
U.S.S.R., Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Cameroun, Central African Republic,

Chad, Congo Republic, Cyprus, Dahomey, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Malifi Madagascar,
Niger, Nigeria, Republic of the Congo, Senegal, Somali, Togo, Voltaic Republic.
Ziess, supra note 20.
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Article 36, Paragraph 2, of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice limits the court's jurisdiction to "international legal disputes"
in: 1) international treaties, 2) international law questions, 3) breach
of international obligations, and 4) remedies for such breach. Therefore, the United States is protected without the domestic
question
28
element of its acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction.
There is the problem of the reciprocity doctrine, which generally
means that since the United States has reserved the power to
determine if a question is domestic, it is only equitable that an
adversary should have the same right, even though the power was
not specifically reserved. France dropped their reservation similar to
the Connally amendment after Norway invoked it against them using
the reciprocity doctrine. The American people have approximately
50,000,000,000 dollars invested internationally which might at any
time be damaged, confiscated or discriminated against. If this should
happen and the United States brought suit in the International Court
with a perfectly valid claim, our adversary could invoke the amendment against us to defeat the court's jurisdiction 2 9 We are the wealthiest nation in the world and we must be prepared to protect our
claims in a world court. Therefore, the repeal of the amendment is in
our own self-interest.
The fundamental principle of our faith as a free nation is government by law. The Connally amendment loses us prestige as leader of
the free world. We speak of being dedicated to bringing law to the
relations of nations as we have established it between man and man.
The rule of law is our best weapon against Communism, and not a
single Communist nation has accepted compulsory jurisdiction. We
were the leader in reserving the right to decide if a controversy is
domestic and we can be a leader in repealing this type of reservation,
even though not the first to do so. To date, the United States has set
the precedent in a trend which lessens the effectiveness of the International Court and we have appeared to favor the rule of war and
force over the rule of law and reason. 0
The United States is a permanent member of the Security Council
of the United Nations and thereby possesses veto power over any
matter coming before it. The only agency through which the court can
enforce decisions is the Security Council. Therefore, if the court
takes jurisdiction over a domestic issue and renders a judgment, the
28 Larson, The Self-Judging Clause and Self-Interest, 46 A.B.J. 729 (1960).
29
0 Larson,

supra note 11.
3 Gambrell, The United Nations, the World Court and the Connally Reservation, 47 A.B.AJ. 57 (1961).
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United States, as a permanent member of the Security Council, could
veto any recommendation for action by the rest of the Security Coun3
cil and refuse to give effect to the judgment. '
The Connally amendment is called "self-judging" because the
invoking nation reserves for itself the right to determine whether a
dispute is international or domestic and, in effect, serves as its own
-judge.32 It seems that a basic premise of any system of law would be
that no man should be entitled to judge himself. If he could, he would
proclaim himself superior to every other human being.
It is also quite possible that the bombs which blow all humanity
off the face of the earth might be avoided by a world court of adequate
jurisdiction which could have settled the dispute by peaceful means. 33
In these ever-changing days of space travel, the idea of sovereignty
as an individual nation must eventually cease to exist and a world
court will be of the utmost necessity.
There is no doubt that such a reservation shows a lack of confidence in and impairs the prestige of the court, and it may be invalid.
Article 36, paragraph 6, of the statute (International Court) says
basically that in the event of a dispute as to whether the court has
jurisdiction, it is a question for the court to decide. (The United
States became a party to the United Nations Charter and the statute
long before the Connally amendment took effect.) If this is true, the
United States would be affected in one of two possible ways; either
the whole of the United States' acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction
would be rendered void; or the acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction
would be binding and the Connally amendment void. In either case,
the United States would have defeated its original purpose.34
The following alternative proposals have been made by one writer
with observations on their effect:
1. The United States should make a special declaration accepting
unconditionally the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in
disputes relating to claims arising out of acts or omissions of a state
which have caused an injury to the person or property of a national of
another state. Then, we would be able to bring claims before the Court
against all those nations which have made no special reservations on this
subject while, by reciprocity, we would be subject to similar claims
against us. Since we have more interest to protect abroad than there
are foreign interests which need protection against us, in the long run,
such a declaration would afford important additional protection to
31 Ibid.
32
Tondel, supra note 8.
33
Baldwin, supra note 7.
34
Larson, supra note 11.
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American investments in many countries, without exposing the United
States to too many claims by foreign countries.
2. The United States should make a special declaration accepting
unconditionally the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to disputes
relating to the interpretation and application of international agreements
concluded by the United States with other states and properly ratified in
accordance with our constitutional processes. The law to be applied is
contained in those treaties and the disputes to be submitted to the Court
would relate only to the principles of law expressly accepted by the
United States through the ratification of these treaties. Since the United
States has already accepted the jurisdiction of the Court with respect
to some treaty (Article 25 in the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation between the United States and the Netherlands, signed at
the Hague, March 27, 1956. U.S. Treaties and Other International
Acts Series, no. 8942), and a new declaration could broaden this acceptance to all treaties past and present.
3. The United States should negotiate a treaty with other members
of NATO conferring upon the court jurisdiction to decide all legal
disputes among NATO countries. This would show that we are sincere
about the rule of law in international affairs and only extend the Court's
jurisdiction to states with which we have common cultural ties and ideas.
4. The United States should replace its declaration accepting the
Court's jurisdiction by a new declaration in which the reservation on
'matters essentially within the jurisdiction of the United States' would
be modified in one of the following ways:
a. The phrase 'as determined by the United States' might be
omitted, thus leaving to the Court rather than the United
States the determination whether a matter is domestic.
b. The reservation might be restricted to 'matters which have
been traditionally considered by the United States as matters
within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States.'
c. The declaration might contain an exhaustive list of matters
considered by the United States as essentially domestic
matters.
d. A list of reserved matters might be an open-ended one and
might be combined with a clause relating to 'any other
matters which have been traditionally considered by the
United States as matters within the domestic jurisdiction
of the United States.'
In addition, serious consideration should be given to various current
proposals for special international tribunals accessible not only to states
but also to individuals and corporations. There is no need to cause
international complications by treating each claim by a national of one
state against another state as a dispute between states. Many matters
might be decided in a satisfactory manner by smaller tribunals without
resort to the International Court of Justice at The Hague. Such special
tribunals need not be restricted to claims by states but like some past
tribunals might be open directly to the private claimants. If private
claims could be treated as a routine matter by such special claims
tribunals, an important cause of irritation would' be removed from
interstate relations.35

35 Sohn, supra note 12.
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I B. Against Repeal

Struggles over the Connally amendment are essentially battles
between those who wish to retain our sovereignty and the internationalists who want a world government. Some argue that the amendment
is the only thing protecting the United States' sovereignty over
matters concerning our domestic security and welfare. 36 A state
cannot be bound by an obligation when the implementation of it
would destroy or gravely endanger it.37 In one of his statements, the
late Mr. Dag Hammarskjild said:
One may recognize that the reluctance of Governments to submit
their controversies to judicial settlement stems in part from the fragmentary and uncertain character of much of international law as it
now exists. When wide margins of uncertainty remain in the law, the
tendency to see a political settlement even in cases when questions of
law be at the heart of the dispute is understandable. Yet, in the longer
view, it is surely in the interest of all Member States to restrict as much
as possible the sphere where sheer strength is an argument and to
extend as widely as possible the area ruled by considerations of law and
justice. In an interdependent world, a greater degree of authority and
effectiveness in international law will be a safeguard, not a threat, to
the freedom and independence of national states.38

A report of a special committee of the House Judiciary Committee
on the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal
Police Organization presented at the first session of the 86th Congress
reported on the value of the Connally amendment. They concluded:
The Connally Amendment basically is of good purpose. It seeks to
safeguard matters which are essentially of domestic concern to the
United States. Under the United Nations' Charter, the International
Court has jurisdiction only over questions of international law-not
domestic matters. It, therefore, does not seem unwise, in the absence
of treaties and any developed principles of international law, that such
items of immigration and certain aspects of our postal or atomic energy
laws which are essentially domestic matters be reserved to the United
States for a decision.

The report says further that in its determination, there are no clearcut rules recognized in international law as to what are and what are
39
not domestic issues.
This is the general reason for non-acceptance of strict compulsory
jurisdiction. The principles which go together to make the body of
36

Zeiss, supra note 20.
International Law 415 (8th ed. 1925).
Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization,
U.N. GEN. Ass.-OFF. lEEC.
10th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 18 (A/2911) (1954-1955).
3378 Hall,

39 STAFF OF SPECIAL Comvr.

OF HOUSE Co.mr. ON nsm Junicmny, 86TH

CONG., IST SESS., REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUsTICE AND THE
INTERNATIONAL CI2V11NAL POLICE ORGANIZATION 3 (Comm. Print 1959).

196,4
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rules called international law are still uncertain. Until international
law becomes more definite, if possible, a nation with as much at stake
as the United States should not submit to compulsory jurisdiction of a
world court.
Raymond Moley, in the February 22, 1960, edition of Newsweek
magazine, described the withdrawal of the Connally amendment as
'legal disarmament," drawing an analogy to the disastrous effects of
unilateral disarmament. The fact is, neither Russia nor any of the
Iron Curtain countries have even reached the point of accepting
compulsory jurisdiction.-" ' Unfortunate as it is, it requires two parties
to make a bargain in international affairs. It is not enough of a
showing of faith for one party to place their domestic well-being in
jeopardy. Before the International Court can gain the necessary
control for an effective world court, it must be recognized as such
and implemented by a show of confidence by not one, but by all of
41
the major powers.

It is quite possible that there is nothing in the United Nations
Charter or the Statute of the International Court of Justice which
would prevent the court from taking jurisdiction over controversies
essentially of a domestic nature. The United Nations Charter speaks
of "domestic jurisdiction" but its definition may not be even similar
to the definition desired by the United States. This possible conflict
must be resolved before the shield of the Connally amendment is
tossed aside. The court's statute has no "domestic matter limitation. 42
Not only does the sovereignty doctrine give the United States
the right to limit our submission to the court's jurisdiction, but
national security and interests demand it. For example, assume that
Panama sues us in the court to compel the relinquishment of the Canal
Zone to Panama or assume that Cuba sues to have our Guantanamo
Naval Base turned over. Without the Connally amendment and with
acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction, the court, under paragraph 6
of article 36 of their statute, would have the United States entirely
under its control for the determination of jurisdiction. The United
States would argue that the matter is domestic and, therefore, not
within the jurisdiction of the court. The court could rule that the
controversy involved the interpretation of a treaty and, therefore,
that there was jurisdiction. 43
40 villy,

The World Court and the Connally Reservation, 46 A.B.A.J. 486

(1960).

41Tbid.

42

Collier, Judicial World Supremacy and the Connally Reservation, 47
43 See Zeiss, supra note 20.

A.B.A.J. 68 (1961).
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Another matter of prime importance is the fact that most controversies which started major wars have not been justiciable. The
cause of World War I, the assassination at Sarajevo of an Austrian
Archduke in July, 1914, and the subsequent Austrian demands for
punishment and apology were not justiciable. Nor was Hitler's
invasion of Poland; nor the Korean "police action."44 This contention
would greatly damage the internationalists and subtract from the
significance given to the International Court as an effective world
tribunal.
The American Bar Association, which formerly condemned the
amendment by a rather heavy majority, reduced the margin against
it to 114 against and 107 for during the 1960 convention. 45 So, we see
that the amendment has gained in respectability among the nation's
lawyers, or at least among those who attended the convention and
voted on the matter.
CONCLUSION

The analysis has thus far progressed in an objective manner,
presenting arguments both for and against retention of the amendment. There is no conceivable way to straddle the fence on this issue.
This is not to say that an extreme measure in either direction is the
answer. The feeling of nationalism runs high, and rightly so. Why
can't nationalism exist concurrently with an effective world court?
This writer feels that it can. As it stands now, the amendment leaves
our acceptance of the court's jurisdiction meaningless; a mockery to be
precedent to the other nations of the world. We, as a nation, are a
leader, the role by which we perform best, and we are a nation which
symbolizes law and order in a democratic society. We, as a nation,
took part in the creation of a world organization and a world court.
We need not make a radical move. One writer recognizes the
harmful aspects of the amendment as it stands and sets forth a threestep program for improvement,, all actions coming through the
executive department of the United States or appointed agencies.
The proposals deal with announcements that the United States will
make no arbitrary decisions under the amendment and has no power
to do so and with the appointment of a special committee to assist
in the determination of controversies as they arise.46 This is at least
a progressive step towards strengthening the International Court and
44 Schweppe, The Connally Reservation Should Not Be Withdrawn, 46
A.B.A.j.
45 782 (1960).
Proceedings of the House of Delegates: Washington, D.C., August 29September 2, 46 A.B.A.J. 1226, 1286 (1960).
46 See Schlesinger, supra note 10.
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lessening the degree of control we could presently exert, and yet not
leaving us vulnerable to the court's will. An agreeable median will be
reached eventually through compromise; the method by which most
crucial issues are decided in this country.
Recognition will have to be given to the shrinking world and the
slow but steady process of a merger of cultures and civilizations of the
East and West, which may eventually bring a uniform definition of
sovereignty and necessitate an all-powerful world organization, including the same type of world court. The transition into a peaceful
world due to the awesome powers of destruction now developed
is another important factor to consider. It is obvious that the present
amendment is not satisfactory to everyone; nothing ever is. The
complete change will not and should not be immediate in time. It
should occur naturally, through man's reasoning, whenever it is
logically feasible to be effectuated. This is a problem to be reckoned
with by our children and perhaps by theirs. There is one thing to
alays keep in mind: it is of the utmost importance that both viewpoints be carefully examined. Then, we will be capable of making an
intelligent, if not a perfect, decision.
John Dixon, Jr.

